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Really Good Theorems Are Those That End
Their Life as Definitions: Why
Olga Kosheleva and Vladik Kreinovich

Abstract It is known that often, after it is proven that a new statement is equivalent
to the original definition, this new statement becomes the accepted new definition
of the same notion. In this paper, we provide a natural explanation for this empirical
phenomenon.

1 Formulation of the Problem
Empirical fact. A recent book [1] cites a statement that is widely believed by mathematicians: that really good theorems are those that end their life as definitions.
This is indeed an empirical fact with which many mathematicians are familiar –
often:
• after an interesting and useful theorem is proven that provides an equivalent condition to the original definition,
• this equivalent statement eventually becomes a new definition.
A natural why-question. A natural question is: why is this phenomenon really
ubiquitous?
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we provide a natural explanation for this
natural phenomenon.
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2 Analysis of the Problem and the Resulting Explanation
Which of the equivalent statements should we select? For many mathematical
notions – be it continuity, compactness, etc. – there are several different properties
equivalent to this notion. We need to select one of these properties as the definition,
then all other properties become theorems.
Which of the equivalent formulations should we select?
What do we want from a definition: a natural idea. The main objective of mathematics is to prove theorems. From this viewpoint, the natural role of a definition is
to help prove theorems about the corresponding notion.
Thus, we should select a definition which, on average, makes it easier to derive
different properties of the corresponding notion.
Let us describe this idea in precise terms. Let A1 , . . . , An denote all the known
results about the corresponding notion. For each of possible definitions D, we can
describe the complexity of deriving the property Ai – as measured, e.g., by the length
of the proof – by c(D → Ai ).
This is the complexity of an individual derivation. To combine these individual
complexity into a meaning average, we need to take into account that different statements Ai may have different importance:
• Some of these statement Ai are important, they appear in many different areas.
• On the other hand, some results Ai are obscure, important for maybe a single
result about some unusual and rarely appearing object.
To take this difference into account, we need to assign, to each statement Ai , a number wi describing, e.g., the relative frequency with which this statement is used in
mathematical literature. Then, average complexity c(D) of selecting the statement D
as the definition can be obtained if we add up all individual complexities multiplied
by these weights wi :
n

c(D) = ∑ wi · c(D → Ai ).

(1)

i=1

What does it mean that a theorem is good? As we have mentioned, often, there
are many equivalent statements describing the same notion, i.e., there are several
statements D′ , D′′ , . . . , which are all equivalent to D:
D ↔ D′ ↔ D′′ . . .
What do we mean when we say that a theorem proving the equivalence D ↔ D′ is a
good theorem? This usually means that once we know that D′ is equivalent to D, it
makes it easier to derive several different results Ai .
What does it mean that a theorem is very good? Similarly, when we say that the
equivalence D ↔ D′ is a very good theorem, this means that, once we know that D′
is equivalent to D, it makes it easier to derive many different results Ai .
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So when does a very good theorem become a new definition? So when does the
new equivalent formulation D′ become a new definition? This happens when the
average length of the derivations from the new definition D′ become smaller than
the average length of deriving statements from the original definition D, i.e., when
n

n

i=1

i=1

∑ wi · c(D′ → Ai ) < ∑ wi · c(D → Ai ).

(2)

When does this happen?
• If D′ corresponds to a very good theorem, this means that we have a large number
of statement Ai for which
c(D′ → Ai ) < c(D → Ai ).
Let us denote the set of the indices i of all these statements by G.
• For all other statements A j , there is no direct and easier derivation from the new
definition D′ . For such statements A j , the change from D to D′ will actually
increase the length of the derivation, since now, to prove these statements A j ,
we will first need to prove D. So, the complexity of the new derivation will now
increase from the original value c(D → A j ) to the new value
c(D′ → A j ) = c(D′ → D) + c(D → A j ).
The inequality (2) will be satisfied if the decrease in complexity of deriving statements Ai with i ∈ G will compensate the increase in complexity caused by the need
to add the length c(D′ → D) to the derivation of all other statements, i.e., if

∑ wi · (c(D → Ai ) − c(D′ → Ai )) > c(D′ → D) · ∑ w j .

i∈G

(3)

j̸∈G

Clearly, when the set G becomes sufficiently large, the left-hand side of the formula (3) indeed becomes larger than the right0hand side, and thus, it becomes reasonable to select D′ as the new definition. This explains the phenomenon described
in [1].
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